NomadicMedic
I know a guy who knows a guy.
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I'm on my phone, so I can't get the citations, but "deviating from the checklist" is what kills people. I recently read a fantastic book about nuclear reactor accidents. Criticality accidents are when the reactor suddenly becomes hypercritical, and "runs away" from the operator. I think we can all agree that when operating a nuclear reactor, checklists to prevent these unplanned excursions are probably a good idea, because supercritical reactors are not a good idea. At all. Ever.
In several criticality accidents, the operators, who were performing routine functions, decided to deviate from the checklist and perform operations that were not indicated. Most of the time investigators were unable to ask the operators why they perform these actions, because they were dead.
It can be assumed that the majority of the operators that control nuclear power generating stations were well-trained. Let's call them the "airway docs" of their field. They managed the criticality of the reactor every day, through normal periods and those periods that may have induced a bit of pucker.
A false sense of security, complacency and dare we say, cockiness was what the NRC determined was the cause for many of the criticality accidents. The operators were well-trained, new the procedures inside and out, had checklists to follow… And disregarded the checklists for their own actions in periods of extreme stress. The exact time when a systemized checklist would be most useful.
I don't know about you, but I'm certainly not too proud to follow a check list and mark off the boxes when I perform an RSI. And I would hope that the person who is performing then induction and intubating my mother, sister or daughter isn't either.
In several criticality accidents, the operators, who were performing routine functions, decided to deviate from the checklist and perform operations that were not indicated. Most of the time investigators were unable to ask the operators why they perform these actions, because they were dead.
It can be assumed that the majority of the operators that control nuclear power generating stations were well-trained. Let's call them the "airway docs" of their field. They managed the criticality of the reactor every day, through normal periods and those periods that may have induced a bit of pucker.
A false sense of security, complacency and dare we say, cockiness was what the NRC determined was the cause for many of the criticality accidents. The operators were well-trained, new the procedures inside and out, had checklists to follow… And disregarded the checklists for their own actions in periods of extreme stress. The exact time when a systemized checklist would be most useful.
I don't know about you, but I'm certainly not too proud to follow a check list and mark off the boxes when I perform an RSI. And I would hope that the person who is performing then induction and intubating my mother, sister or daughter isn't either.