Do you ever worry about stuff you say online?

[MMiz]

Do you ever worry that a boss, significant other, or anyone will google your name or somehow read your posts at this forum or anywhere else online? What about if you keep a blog or online journal?

I only say this because I'm usually anal about what I say online, kind of like how I am when that little recording light on our ambulance video cameras start blinking.

How do you find the balance?

 

[Summit]

Yes. Anyone who really knows me will be able to figue out who I am (and it has happpened). I do my best not to say anything online that I wouldn't say to someone else on my service.

 

[Wingnut]

Everyone who knows me knows all my quirks so I'm not worried about it. I don't keep an online journal or any journal for that matter, and I don't talk dirty to people. Anyone who tries to "find" me, is basically screwed. We're heavily armed

 

[emtbass]

u really have cameras on you box?

 

[MMiz]

Originally posted by emtbass@Jul 22 2005, 12:42 AM
u really have cameras on you box?

Some of our units have those cameras that go off when you take a turn too fast or hit a bump... or larger object.

They record a minute or two before, and a minute or two after the incident. There is also a big red panic button on the bottom.

When you start talking crap about someone and your partner wants to be funny... they hit the button.
When you start talking crap about someone it's the law that you will hit a bump or the camera will go off... it's just how things work.

They've been effective, and they've caught some amazing things. By all means from a management perspective they DO work, but the crews would fight over who didn't take that truck out for the day. Management also decided they weren't worth it, we only have a couple cameras.

 

[TTLWHKR]

Wait. Never Mind.

 

[MMiz]

Originally posted by TTLWHKR@Jul 22 2005, 02:18 AM
Wait. Never Mind.

Thatta boy blue, you never cease to amaze me. I'm loading up the station wagon. Me, capt and 'ole Chimp are going to be over for Sunday dinner

(Edit: I didn't notice your significantly shorter post, the reply email I got was much more informative )

 

[Luno]

Nope, everything is an extension of you, if you hide behind anonymity to blow BS, you deserve to get your @@@ kicked in real life. If you really feel that way, your opinion shouldn't be restricted to online. But that's just my opinion.

 

[MMiz]

Originally posted by Luno@Jul 22 2005, 04:25 AM
Nope, everything is an extension of you, if you hide behind anonymity to blow BS, you deserve to get your @@@ kicked in real life. If you really feel that way, your opinion shouldn't be restricted to online. But that's just my opinion.

What about the time I wanted to tell the story of ..... but I don't want my students to find it and realize Mr. --- did X?

 

[rescuecpt]

I've had things bite me in the arse, related to this site actually. I got threatened with a lawsuit over something. It all worked out just fine in the end (thanks Mods) but I will definitely be more careful about the topics I chat about.

 

[stones]

The first amendment protects you from retaliation for your opinions and views expressed anywhere, including, online. It does not protect you from releasing others private information (ie patient info, company business, etc)

I never say anything in a forum or online I wouldnt say in person if the circumstances allowed for it.

There are circumstances that allow for different things though. You can come to a forum and say you hate your job, but you wouldnt say that to your boss, that would just be ignorant, and saying it to your boss could be taken as being belligerant.

 

[TTLWHKR]

Originally posted by MMiz+Jul 22 2005, 03:19 AM--></div><table border='0' align='center' width='95%' cellpadding='3' cellspacing='1'><tr><td>QUOTE (MMiz @ Jul 22 2005, 03:19 AM)</td></tr><tr><td id='QUOTE'> <!--QuoteBegin-TTLWHKR@Jul 22 2005, 02:18 AM
Wait. Never Mind.

Thatta boy blue, you never cease to amaze me. I'm loading up the station wagon. Me, capt and 'ole Chimp are going to be over for Sunday dinner

(Edit: I didn't notice your significantly shorter post, the reply email I got was much more informative ) [/b][/quote]
I know. I posted "nevermind" to be sarcastic.. As in a play on the title, "Do you ever worry about stuff you say online".

I only gave enough information to identify all that you already know.

But it's a great place to vacation.

 

[TTLWHKR]

I'm a union employee, I'll strike and sue if they fire me.

 

[Ridryder911]

Actually, had a fellow co-worker get upset about a post an another forum.. thought it regarded him .. coming in with ETOH from previous night. Actually, it was NOT about him at all.. guilty conscience..huh ?..

I believe, some statements in chat rooms may typed or said that probably may not be said face to face.. but, I don't say anything I would not say to you in person.

Be safe,
Ridryder 911

 

[Jon]

Yeah.... I try to be VERY vague when posting stories that bash anyone (except PARescue).

I'm not worried about my significant other finding this site (what significant other) but do sometimes worry about my boss

Jon

 

[ffemt8978]

Originally posted by stones@Jul 22 2005, 07:03 AM
The first amendment protects you from retaliation for your opinions and views expressed anywhere, including, online. It does not protect you from releasing others private information (ie patient info, company business, etc)

I never say anything in a forum or online I wouldnt say in person if the circumstances allowed for it.

There are circumstances that allow for different things though. You can come to a forum and say you hate your job, but you wouldnt say that to your boss, that would just be ignorant, and saying it to your boss could be taken as being belligerant.

The First Amendment only protects you from GOVERNMENT interference with your freedom of speech. You are not protected from private citizens or organizations interfering with or seeking civil actions for your viewpoints.

 

[irritator]

I eould beg to differ, an employ is not an exempt entity from first amendment protections as long as the employee is not engaged by the employer or directly representing the employer at the time.

If a person makes a post from home, while off duty, they are in fact protected from the employer, as long as there is no direct naming of said employer. They are still protected as long as what they say is true, even if they do name the meployer, i imagine the new federal whistleblower laws could even be stretched to protect the employee, even further if it were posted in the ems news section.

now heaven help the employee if they post while on duty.

 

[TTLWHKR]

© MICROSOFT-ENCARTA ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 2004
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

First Amendment

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.


THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CIVIL LIABILITY;

The courts have long since recognized the First Amendment as a firm barrier against government censorship of speech and the press. But how well does the First Amendment cover civil actions-that is, when a non-governmental plaintiff sues for injury allegedly caused by written or spoken expression? The situation is unstable, warns Robert M. O'Neil, head of the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression at the University of Virginia, because lawyers and courts have been nibbling at the assumption that the First Amendment provides universal protection against collection of damages. He foresees trouble in such sectors as libel disseminated on the Internet, privacy intrusions via new technology, the advertising of dangerous products or services, and violence purportedly stemming from films or books-all the subject of recent lawsuits. And he notes that First Amendment protection for the newsgathering process remains as shaky as ever.

The First Amendment and the Internet;

The First Amendment does not cover all speech acts. It instead extends constitutional protection to
media for the communication of ideas, which are forms of social interaction that realize First
Amendment values. The constitutional question, therefore, is whether particular uses of encryption
source code are embedded within such media. It is insufficient to distinguish, as do current federal
regulations, the publication of encryption source code in electronic form from its publication in
written form. Instead it is necessary to focus on the social contexts within which encryption source
code is used, whether in electronic or written form. From a constitutional perspective, it is one thing
to use source code to convey ideas to an audience, and it is quite another to use source code to run a
computer. The article suggests how each of these situations might be constitutionally analyzed.
Source code is a high level computer language typically used by programmers to compose
computer software.
1
Federal regulations prohibit the unlicensed export of computer software,
including source code, designed to encrypt messages.
2
To post encryption source code to the
Internet is in most circumstances to “export” it under the terms of the regulations.
3
Federal
regulations do not seek to prohibit the unlicensed export of “a printed book or other printed
material setting forth encryption source code,” but they do extend to “encryption source code in
electronic form or media (e.g., computer diskette or CD ROM).”
4
Daniel J. Bernstein, a professor of mathematics, statistics, and computer science, composed an
encryption program called Snuffle in source code.
5
He wished to “present his work on Snuffle
within the academic and scientific communities.”
6
Bernstein brought suit challenging the federal
regulations as a prior restraint on his ability to speak. The Bernstein case raises the fascinating
and controversial question of whether computer programs written in source code can be a form of
expression for purposes of the First Amendment. Lee Tien’s rich and complex article
substantially contributes to our understanding of this question.
7
Tien’s distinction between “coverage” and “protection,” for example, is exactly right.
8
To
conclude that the First Amendment “covers” conduct, like the export of encryption source code,
is to assert that the constitutionality of the conduct’s regulation must be determined by reference
to First Amendment doctrine and analysis. To conclude that the conduct is “protected” by the
First Amendment, on the other hand, is to assert that the regulation of the conduct is
unconstitutional. The question of First Amendment coverage goes to the threshold issue of theഊkind of analysis that should be brought to bear in evaluating the constitutionality of state
regulations; the question of First Amendment protection goes to the ultimate judgments that we
ought to reach in a particular case.
The threshold question posed by the Bernstein case is whether federal regulation of encryption
source code is to be assessed under the doctrines of the First Amendment. This is a question of
coverage, and it shall be my focus in this brief comment. Bernstein answered this question in the
affirmative, holding that the constitutionality of the federal regulations was to be determined by
First Amendment principles. A closely analogous case, however, has seemingly reached the
contrary conclusion.
9
In his article, Tien argues that First Amendment coverage should presumptively extend to all
speech acts, by which he means all acts of communication in which a speaker intends “to produce
understanding in a hearer by resort to or in virtue of the conventional meaning of what the
speaker says.”
10
Thus for Tien the question of whether the publication of encryption code ought to
be covered by the First Amendment depends upon whether publishing source code is a speech
act.
11
For reasons I have articulated elsewhere, I believe that the premise of Tien’s argument is
untenable.
12
There are many forms of speech acts that the First Amendment does not cover.
Product warnings are clearly speech acts according to Tien’s definition, for example, and yet they
are universally regulated in ways that are not covered by the First Amendment.
13
Contracts are
certainly speech acts, and yet contract law proceeds without the interference of First Amendment
analysis. The general point is that social life largely occurs through language; social life is thus
filled—one might even say composed of—interactions that meet Tien’s definition of speech acts.
A First Amendment that covered all these aspects of social life would be nothing like the First
Amendment which we currently possess. The presence of a speech act is therefore not sufficient
to justify First Amendment coverage.
14
First Amendment coverage is sometimes triggered by what a legal rule regulates, and sometimes
it is triggered by why a legal rule seeks to regulate.
15
These inquiries are logically and practically
independent of each other, and in this comment I shall focus exclusively on the first. I shall
address the question whether the regulation of encryption source code ought to be subject to First
Amendment scrutiny, but I shall not discuss whether the purpose of the federal regulations at
issue in Bernstein would independently warrant First Amendment coverage.
If the presence of a speech act is not a sufficient condition for First Amendment coverage, how
are we to specify the class of actions that does trigger First Amendment analysis? The view I
have defended elsewhere is that First Amendment coverage is triggered by those forms of social
interaction that realize First Amendment values.
16
If we believe that the function of the FirstഊAmendment is to protect a marketplace of ideas, we will extend First Amendment coverage to
those forms of social interaction that constitute such a marketplace. If we believe that the function
of the First Amendment is to protect the communications necessary for democratic self-determination,
we will extend First Amendment coverage to social interactions that instantiate the
value of self-government.
From this perspective, Tien is fundamentally misguided to believe that he can explain First
Amendment coverage “without appealing to a grand theoretical framework of First Amendment
values.”
17
If First Amendment coverage does not extend to all speech acts, then such a framework
is at a minimum necessary in order to provide the criteria by which to select the subset of speech
acts that merit constitutional attention.
Actually the situation is more complicated than this, because First Amendment coverage is not
limited to speech acts. It extends to forms of interaction that realize First Amendment values. In
work published elsewhere I have used the term “medium” to designate such forms of interaction.
18
The Court has held that “motion pictures are a significant medium for the communication of
ideas,”
19
for example, which signifies that film, considered as a genre, serves First Amendment
values.
The genre of the cinema, however, encompasses far more than speech acts. It includes materials,
like celluloid; functional machines, like projectors; buildings, like movie houses; social
organizations, like studios; and so forth. If the state were to prohibit the use of projectors without
a license, First Amendment coverage would undoubtedly be triggered. This is not because
projectors constitute speech acts, but because they are integral to the forms of interaction that
comprise the genre of the cinema. The licensing of projectors would have important effects on
that genre, effects that would be quite pertinent to the very First Amendment values that lead us
to protect motion pictures in the first place. That is why First Amendment coverage would likely
extend to a law requiring projectors to be licensed.
First Amendment coverage, therefore, depends upon how the object of regulation is integrated
into First Amendment media. Although a state may without First Amendment scrutiny prohibit
public nudity, a First Amendment question would surely be raised if a state were to prohibit
nudity within the cinema.
20
It would even raise a First Amendment question if a state were to
attempt to apply a general prohibition of nudity to motion pictures.
21
First Amendment coverage,
in other words, does not attach to nudity considered as an isolated kind of conduct, but rather to
the relationship between nudity and the forms of social interaction that the First Amendment
seeks to protect.
Some judges and commentators, however, have sought to determine whether the First
Amendment covers encryption source code by deciding whether such code, viewed as an isolatedഊthing, is “inherently a functional device.”
22
But if the analysis I have suggested is correct, Tien is
certainly right to conclude that one cannot “answer the coverage question by looking at software
as a thing.”
23
Although projectors are unambiguously a functional thing, the First Amendment
might well cover their regulation because of the potential impact on motion pictures. The correct
focus of constitutional inquiry is, therefore, as Tien properly asserts, “how software is used in an
act.”
24
The coverage question depends upon how the licensing of encryption source code affects
First Amendment media.
It is clear that the federal regulations at issue in Bernstein attempt roughly to acknowledge this
point by distinguishing between encryption source code in “a printed book or other printed
material setting forth encryption source code,” and “encryption source code in electronic form or
media (e.g., computer diskette or CD ROM).”
25
The regulations do not require a license for
reproducing source code in printed material.
26
This exception would be incomprehensible if
preventing disclosure of the information contained in encryption source code were the only
concern of the regulations. Evidently the regulations were also concerned with protecting First
Amendment values.
We can identify one source of these values by attending to Tien’s conclusion that “a computer
program in source code form is a procedure written in a programming language.”
27
Authors
routinely write books and articles in which they communicate procedures to each other. Examples
might be articles that explain the procedures necessary for medical diagnoses, or books that
explain the procedures necessary for experiments in the physical sciences. Because we regard
books and articles as a medium for the communication of ideas, such writings are unambiguously
covered by the First Amendment.
For purposes of the First Amendment, the language in which books and articles are written is
without importance. So long as books and articles communicate ideas to others, it makes no
difference whether they are written in French, or in mathematical symbols, or in computer source
code. Just as the First Amendment would cover a law requiring authors to obtain a license before
publishing in an article the mathematical equations describing nuclear fusion, so would it cover
regulations requiring a license before printing in an article the source code for an encryption
program.
Some analysis roughly like this must explain why federal regulations permit encryption source
code to be published without interference in book form. Why, then, do the regulations forbid the
unlicensed publication of the identical source code in “electronic form or media (e.g., computer
diskette or CD ROM)”? The federal government defended this distinction by arguing that when
source code is published in electronic form, it does not implicate First Amendment concerns. In
Bernstein, the federal government contended that source code in electronic form is a form of
software “used to control directly the operation of a computer without conveying information toഊthe user. In the government’s view, by targeting this unique functional aspect of source code,
rather than the content of the ideas that may be expressed therein, the export regulations manage
to skirt entirely the concerns of the First Amendment.”
28
The government’s argument, however, can not be correct. Publishing software in print is covered
by the First Amendment because it forms part of public discourse and debate. We know that this
same discourse and debate can occur over the Internet and in electronic form.
29
So long as the
publication of encryption source code forms part of this public discourse and debate, it will be
covered by the First Amendment, whether it is set forth in a printed article or in an online
discussion. The government’s analysis leads directly to the absurd conclusion that an article
about encryption code that would unambiguously be covered by the First Amendment when
published in Scientific American, would somehow lose that coverage when scanned and posted to
the Internet.
It may be the case, of course, that there are stronger justifications for prohibiting the publication
of encryption code in electronic form than in printed form, a question about which I intimate no
view. I observe only that this question goes to the issue of First Amendment protection; it is
relevant to whether or not electronically reproduced encryption software may be regulated when
analyzed under applicable First Amendment doctrines. It does not go to the question of First
Amendment coverage.
30
The decisive question for coverage is whether or not the publication of the source code forms part
of a First Amendment medium, and this question can be affirmatively answered even if the
publication of the source code is in electronic form. For purposes of First Amendment coverage,
it makes no difference whether an author wishes to discuss an encryption program written in
source code in an article published in hard copy, or in an article electronically distributed through
the Internet.
Suppose, however, that a person does not wish to discuss an encryption program written in source
code, but to use an encryption program. We might imagine a consumer who buys a disk

© MICROSOFT-ENCARTA ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 2004
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED


containing encryption software, intending to insert the disk into his computer to employ the
software to encrypt his messages. In this situation, the content of the source code is not a subject
of discussion or debate.
31
The consumer does not know what the source code says; the code
speaks directly to the consumer’s computer.
The author of encryption software who distributes encryption source code to consumers to be
used in this fashion is therefore not participating in public dialogue or debate. For this reason,
regulation of encryption software in such contexts would seem to raise very different
constitutional questions than any we have so far discussed. Such regulation appears, on its face,
no different than the regulation of hardware in computers.ഊNo doubt this is the paradigmatic situation that the government had in mind when it argued that
the publication of encryption source code in electronic form was “used to control directly the
operation of a computer without conveying information to the user.”
32
The difficulty with the
government’s position, however, is that for encryption source code to function in this way, it is a
necessary but not sufficient condition for it to be written in electronic, rather than printed form.
To know whether encryption source code forms part of a dialogue between humans or instead
serves as instructions to computers, we must know more than that it is written in electronic form;
we must also know the social circumstances of its sale and application.
For purposes of First Amendment coverage, therefore, the relevant distinction is not between
encryption source code published in electronic as opposed to printed form, but rather between
encryption source code that is itself part of public dialogue and encryption source code that is
meant merely to be used. This latter distinction is surely messier—more difficult to formulate and
enforce—than that presently contained in federal regulations. But it is the only constitutionally
defensible distinction.
Unfortunately the distinction does not completely settle the question of First Amendment
coverage. This is because encryption software can affect First Amendment media in various
different ways. If encryption source code is itself a subject of discussion within a First
Amendment medium, First Amendment coverage clearly ought to apply to attempts to regulate
the publication of the code. That is why the Court in Bernstein was assuredly correct to hold that
in the circumstances of the case the validity of the federal regulations had to be determined by
reference to applicable First Amendment principles.
33
But even if encryption source code is not
itself a subject of public discussion, its regulation might nevertheless affect public discussion in
ways that ought to trigger First Amendment coverage.
To see how this might be so, recall our earlier discussion of movie projectors. Such projectors
form no part of the speech content of movies. But a law forbidding the screening of films without
a licensed projector would probably be covered by the First Amendment. We would be concerned
about the law’s potential impact on the medium of movies, in exactly the same way that we
would be concerned about the potential impact on the press of a law that required all books to be
printed on presses that were licensed by the state.
34
The First Amendment concerns that immediately spring to mind in these examples are those of
viewpoint discrimination. We know that certain kinds of licensing schemes can be used to distort
the ideas expressed through the media of film or books. Because we wish ideas to be freely and
fully expressed through these media, we are alert to scrutinize licensing schemes under First
Amendment standards to ensure that they do not compromise this constitutional value. The
licensing scheme challenged in Bernstein, applied to the public discussion at issue in that case,ഊraises analogous constitutional concerns.
State regulation, however, can compromise First Amendment media in ways that do not involve
viewpoint discrimination. An obvious instance might be a law that prohibits newsprint in order to
save trees. Newsprint is a material necessary for the publication of most newspapers. Although a
law proscribing newsprint would be viewpoint (and content) neutral, it would carry the potential
for so significantly affecting the First Amendment medium of newspapers that we would
certainly review it under First Amendment principles. We would want to assure ourselves that it
would not compromise the constitutional value we attribute to newspapers.
Such review, including the threshold question of whether to engage in such review (which is the
coverage question), will always rest upon a constitutional sociology by which we specify the
social aspects of the medium that carry constitutional significance. This sociology can often
prove difficult and puzzling, especially when it involves new and evolving technologies.
Consider, for example, a viewpoint (and content) neutral law that prohibits CD players. We know
that music is a First Amendment medium.
35
CD players are machines that do not form part of the
content of that medium, and yet today most music is distributed and heard through the technology
of compact disks. Prohibiting CD players would materially disrupt the pattern of social
relationships that comprise the contemporary medium of music. The First Amendment question
would be whether this disruption threatens to undermine the constitutional values that have led us
to classify music as a First Amendment medium. In such circumstances, the extension of First
Amendment coverage would signify that we find this a sufficiently close or important question as
to require us to decide it under First Amendment principles.
An analogous argument might be made to justify extending First Amendment coverage to
encryption software. Even when such software functions purely as a “machine”
36
to make digital
messages secret, we must ask whether its regulation might compromise the constitutional values
we attribute to particular First Amendment media. The empirical and normative aspects of such
an inquiry are, to say the least, formidable. First, we would have to assess the effects of federal
regulation of encryption source code on the production and use of encryption software. Second,
we would have to specify the impact of these effects on the various First Amendment media that
employ encryption software. Finally we would have to face the normative question of whether
this impact would raise sufficient constitutional concerns as to merit First Amendment coverage.
Tien offers the valuable suggestion that encryption software might be conceived as providing the
equivalent of envelopes which protect the privacy of underlying digital messages.

© MICROSOFT-ENCARTA ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 2004
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED


37
In some
circumstances, a law that strips speech of privacy would certainly merit First Amendment
coverage. Consider, for example, a regulation prohibiting mail from using envelopes and
requiring that the contents of all letters be made legible to mail handlers. I have no doubt thatഊcourts would scrutinize such a law under relevant First Amendment doctrine. This is because the
chill on participating in a First Amendment medium that comes from exposure is a well-recognized
First Amendment interest.
38
Laws prohibiting anonymous political leaflets have thus
been struck down because of their potential impact on speakers.
39
Encryption software is a way of preventing an analogous chill within digital media. It is probable
that First Amendment coverage would extend to a law requiring a live operator to monitor all
phone conversations.
40
We might imagine an analogous argument for First Amendment coverage
of federal regulations of encryption source code if the world were such that digital phone
conversations were routinely monitored, and if the effect of the regulations were essentially to
deprive us of the ability to avoid such eavesdropping. It is not difficult to think up analogous
arguments about communication over the Internet.
It is far beyond the ambition of this brief comment to make or to evaluate any such arguments.
Digital First Amendment media, like the Internet, are so new and have such labile patterns of
social interaction, that it seems to me enormously difficult to acquire reliable normative or
descriptive traction on the relevant questions. My point in raising this line of inquiry is not to
suggest a final resolution of the problem, but instead to indicate that it will be necessary to pursue
this line of inquiry if we ever aspire to a more complete understanding of the issue of First
Amendment coverage of federal regulation of encryption source code.

Overview of Free Speech Protection
More than a constitutional guarantee preventing government restriction on public debate, the First Amendment also one of the nation's most familiar and acclaimed cultural icons. Freedom of speech and the press is a vital part of the political, social and cultural growth of our country.

Although adopted as part of the Bill of Rights in 1791, most First Amendment doctrine is a result of twenty-century litigation. It wasn't until 1925, in Gitlow v. New York, that the Supreme Court extended the First Amendment freedoms of speech and the press to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause. Ancillary rights--those integral to but not explicit within the First Amendment--were not doctrinally recognized until the 1960s, when the Court decided cases determining the laws of libel and commercial speech, and establishing rights of privacy, access, and anonymity. The meaning of the First Amendment has continued to develop rapidly, in part because of changes in and the increasing importance of new technology.

Unlawful Restriction on Speech
Vagueness. The Court has ruled unconstitutional laws that are so vaguely written that persons of average inteligence must guess at (and likely differ as to) its meaning and application. Such laws "chill speech" because citizens facing such laws would keep quiet out of fear that their intended conduct would be illegal. As well, vague laws leave law enforcement officers too much discretion to enforce the law as they see fit.

Overbreadth. The Court has ruled unconstitutional laws that are so broadly written as to prohibit protected speech as well as unprotected speech.

Prior Restraint. Attempts to exercise prior restraints of speech or publication are almost always illegal, because such a restraint is an irreversible sanction on expression. However, licensing restrictions are upheld to various degrees in different media. The Court has said that each medium presents particular problems, and thus although the principles of free speech do not vary, every medium will be analyzed and treated as unique. The most striking example of this standard is the licensing regulations and right of reply requirements imposed on broadcasters.

Content Regulation. Any regulation based on the content of expression is subject to strict scrutiny: the Court will permit the regulation of content of speech only so long as the regulation is narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest, and there is no less restrictive alternative.

Relevant case law:
Bartnicki v. Vopper. A radio host could not be punished for disclosing the contents of an illegally intercepted telephone conversation. The majority opinion by Justice Stevens states that the case presents "a conflict between interests of the highest order--on the one hand, the interest in the full and free dissemination of information concerning public issues, and, on the other hand, the interest in individual privacy."

Cohen v. California. Wearing a jacket with "**** the Draft" on the back is expressive conduct fully protected by the First Amendment. Because the statement is not obscenity, incitement, or fighting words, punishment of such conduct must be analyzed under strict scrutiny. Real Audio recording of the oral argument before the Court.

Compelled Speech. The government cannot compel an individual to speak a message. Under this doctrine, in Miami Herald Publishing Co v. Tornillo the Court prohibited "right of reply" laws in print media, because a statute compelling a newspaper to print a reply would chill speech as newspapers would be less likely to cover incendiary public affairs. The prohibition on compelling speech has been used to overturn laws requiring speakers to reveal their identity, and thus creates further protection for the right of anonymity.

Despite the absolutism of the clause, "Congress shall make no law" has never been interpreted by the Court as an absolute prohibition on government regulation of speech. The Court has often said that the primary purpose of the First Amendment is to protect speech that promotes a robust public debate. Therefore, where speech is less valuable--a judgement made on the basis of the speech's category, not its content--it is granted less protection or no protection at all.

Lawful Regulation on Speech
Obscenity. Speech defined as obscenity is outside the boundaries of First Amendment protection. As defined by Miller v. California, obscenity is speech that (1) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find, taken as a whole, to appeal to the prurient interest; (2) depicts or describes in a patently offensive manner specifically defined sexual conduct; and (3) lacks as a whole serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. The definition of obscenity, developed in 1973, focuses on a local "community standard," and has proven to be the crux of litigation surrounding internet censorship cases, which by their nature cannot depend upon local community standards. Further information is available at EPIC's COPA Litigation Page.

Fighting Words. Speech likely to provoke an average listener to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of peace, falls outside the protection of the First Amendment because the words have no important role in the marketplace of ideas the freedom of speech is designed to promote. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.

Commercial Speech. Commercial speech, which was warranted no protection by the Court until 1980 in Central Hudson Gas & Electric, is now protected under an intermediate level of scrutiny because the motivation to market goods and services is believed sufficient to overcome any chill caused by government regulation. The government can ban deceptive or illegal commercial speech; any other regulation must be supported by a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions, regulations in proportion to that interest, and a limitation on expression designed carefully to achieve the state's goal.

Incitement ("clear and present danger"). The government can regulate speech that is intended and likely to incite "imminent lawless action," or where the speech presents a "clear and present danger" to the security of the nation. Brandenburg v. Ohio.

Relevant case law:
Schenck v. United States. Upholding defendants' convictions under the Espionage Act for distribution of anti-war materials during World War I because even "the most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic."
Time Place and Manner. Content-neutral regulation of the time, place, or manner of speech that does not interfere with the message being delivered and leaves open adequate alternative channels of communication is permissible.

Libel/Slander. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court recognized that expansive libel protection chills speech because speakers will be less likely to publish if they can be punished merely for being wrong. Therefore, the First Amendment requires public officials and public figures prove "actual malice" (knowing or reckless disregard for the truth of the statement). Public figures include those with fame, notoriety, and those who have injected themselves into the public debate on an issue. However, in Gertz v. Welch, the Court limited this expansive protection to public figure, not public causes: a publisher of defamatory statements about an individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure may not claim protection against liability for defamation on the ground that the statements concern an issue of public or general interest. Private figures must prove that a statement is false, and that the speaker engaged in some degree of negligence (mere falsity of the statement is insufficient). Laws vary state to state.

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Relevant case law:
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell. Public figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of outrage (intentional infliction of emotional distress) without proving actual malice.
First Amendment Law and Technology
When the First Amendment was adopted, the "speech" at issue was person-to-person or newsprint. As new methods of communication are developed, they have presented unique challenges to First Amendment doctrine.

Post World War I, when motion pictures became readily accessible to all, the government became concerned over the potentially great influence this new medium would have over the morality and education of the American public. Specifically, many were concerned the availability and persuasiveness of the medium presented opportunities for filmmakers to seduce viewers with prurient images and religious or political propaganda. In response to these fears, licensing systems were implemented and upheld as constitutional. In 1915 the Court upheld licensing regulations against free speech challenges on the grounds that "the exhibition of moving pictures is a business, pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit, like other spectacles, not to be regarded ... as part of the press of the country." However, in 1948 the Court extended First Amendment protection to the film industry, and condemned government licensing systems. As a result, the industry moved towards self regulation through the development of what is now the Motion Picture Association of America, and the self-imposed ratings system.

The most notable examples of existing medium-specific government restrictions are the regulations imposed on radio and television broadcasters. The Radio Act was passed in 1927, permitting spectrum allocation by the government to those broadcasters who pledged to serve the public interest. The alleged justification for such a licensing system (an unconstitutional prior restraint in other media contexts) was the natural scarcity of the spectrum, and the need to cut down on signal interference for national security or emergency. The 1927 Act and the 1934 Communications Act imposed numerous content restrictions on broadcasters, including the "right of reply," (unlawful in print) and prohibitions on indecent, profane, or obscene speech. Such content regulations have been upheld because of the unique pervasiveness of the medium, which intrudes into the home and poses a risk that children will hear. The right of reply has been upheld because it was believed that the spectrum cannot accommodate everyone, therefore those granted a license must act as public fiduciaries.

Relevant case law:
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation George Carlin's monologue "filthy words" (listing the "seven dirty words" in a variety of contexts and colloquialisms ) because "vulgar," "offensive" and "shocking" was properly subject to time, place, and manner regulation and could be played only late at night when the possibility that children were listening was vastly reduced. The First Amendment protection available to broadcast media is the most limited because "of the uniquely pervasive presence that medium of expression occupies in the lives of our people. Broadcasts extend into the privacy of the home and it is impossible completely to avoid those that are patently offensive."
Real Audio recording of the oral argument before the Court.
Red Lion v. FCC upholding a "right of reply" requirement.


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www.epic.org/free_speech/+Does+the+first+amendment+cover+what+is+said+on+the+internet&hl=en]EPIC Archive - Free Speech and Privacy laws[/url]

Fact Net Dot Org - Free Speech and the Internet

 

[ffemt8978]

TTLWHKR,

Could you provide a reference link to where you found that information? Thanks.

 

[Summit]

Originally posted by irritator@Jul 22 2005, 02:49 PM
I eould beg to differ, an employ is not an exempt entity from first amendment protections as long as the employee is not engaged by the employer or directly representing the employer at the time.

If a person makes a post from home, while off duty, they are in fact protected from the employer, as long as there is no direct naming of said employer. They are still protected as long as what they say is true, even if they do name the meployer, i imagine the new federal whistleblower laws could even be stretched to protect the employee, even further if it were posted in the ems news section.

now heaven help the employee if they post while on duty.

In an Employment-at-will state they can fire you at any time for any reason or no reason (except violations of labor laws (can't fire you for refusing to work for free) and unlawfull discrimination)