- 4,521
- 3,243
- 113
Wanna feel old? In 1999 I was 5 years old.
Nice. I don't really need any help feeling old, though.
I was 24 in 1999.
Last edited:
Follow along with the video below to see how to install our site as a web app on your home screen.
Note: This feature may not be available in some browsers.
Wanna feel old? In 1999 I was 5 years old.
I was reluctant to want to get into this when it is so fresh for these crewmembers and their families,
What's your suggestion then? Increased regulation to cut down on the number of aircraft? You mention the hiring of minimally experienced pilots as a problem, but I imagine more stringent hiring requirements really have to be company driven on an individual level. Does some of it start at the hospitals and EDs themselves? If the doc requesting a transfer recognizes that an extra hour transport time isn't going to be detrimental to this patient, maybe they can start arranging a ground CCT instead.
Nice. I don't really need any help feeling old, though.
I was 24 in 1999.
Touché. I was reluctant to want to get into this when it is so fresh for these crewmembers and their families, but you're right in saying this is the only time we listen and pay attention.
What's your suggestion then? Increased regulation to cut down on the number of aircraft? You mention the hiring of minimally experienced pilots as a problem, but I imagine more stringent hiring requirements really have to be company driven on an individual level. Does some of it start at the hospitals and EDs themselves? If the doc requesting a transfer recognizes that an extra hour transport time isn't going to be detrimental to this patient, maybe they can start arranging a ground CCT instead.
Most importantly, how do you cut down on the poor weather flights crews are taking? Part of it is obviously lip service, but with the decisions in the crew's hands and company insistence that there is no pressure to fly it seems like they're at least attempting to do the right thing. It sounds like it's the general culture and logical fallacies that make crews take flights when they shouldn't in most cases.
I'll admit, I've never been involved in HEMS so I'm not 100% certain how the process works. I know the crews have the ultimate say in "fly/no fly," but is there anyone above them that can issue a guaranteed "no fly" due to weather? I'm imagining an independent regional (and hugely unpopular) aviation/meteorology expert who is not employed by the HEMS programs themselves and can issue a blanket "flying is allowed or is not allowed on this route at this time" every time an aeromedical transport is requested. Maybe they can consult with the crews regarding their equipment and opinions on the flight. The crew could override a "flying is allowed" recommendation and choose not to go, but they would be bound by the "no fly" ruling. This would prevent competing companies from jumping the transfer in borderline weather because they really want the transport or future contracts as well. Is there any feasibility to a program like that or am I totally off base?
CANMAN is 100% right. Now is the only time to talk about this, because the reality is that this is the only time that people are actually paying any attention.
We are closing in on 20 years since I started in HEMS, and I can tell you that it is the same movie being played over and over again:
- A HEMS crew makes a poor decision(s) and crashes as a direct result of their poor decision(s)
- Everyone is shocked and in mourning.
- No one is allowed to discuss it bluntly because "the NTSB report isn't even out yet", so "let's just honor them and mourn right now. Let's not speculate, mmmkay?"
- Crew is described by everyone as heroic and highly skilled and dedicated, and no one even thinks about being critical of their decisions
- FlightWeb gets blacked out, everyone changes their profile pic to the death wings, everyone goes to the memorials and talks about safety.
- We say that we have new guardian angels now and that the crew was heroic and died doing what they loved, "so others may live", and other sappy, meaningless things to make us feel better about the senselessness of it.
- A week later, websites go back to their normal color, profile pics get changed back, and everyone not personally impacted by the crash forgets about it
- Months later the NTSB report comes out and confirms what everyone knew. Everyone pauses for a moment and makes some cursory statement about "safety first - we need to stop these tragedies", and then goes back to doing things the exact same way.
(snip snip, post was too long and won't let me submit)
The bottom line is that we all really need to stop viewing these crashes as some romantic, selfless sacrifice that we all hate, but that has to happen occasionally in order to save lives. It isn't that at all - it's actually senseless and even purposeless. We aren't heroes - we are just workers. We didn't sacrifice ourselves when we crashed and died - we screwed up, plain and simple. We aren't dedicated and selfless, we are stupid and egotistical.
I was linked this thread off of another site and haven't logged in here in quite some time. I wanted to log in and say that I tend to disagree with Remi (or perhaps just his approach), but I agree with the bulk of this post and find it mirrors my short (2 year) experience in HEMS.
At the end of the day, it's got nothing to do with twin engine vs single, a Bell 206 vs EC145, or a community for profit vs hospital non profit. The crashes all follow the same general M.O., highly motivated type-a personalities that come from risk taking, high adrenaline backgrounds and love flying. Bad decisions are made, deaths happen, and then we rush to blame the company, the airframe, the patient acuity, or whatever other non related factor that doesn't really matter. As long as helicopters are made and operated by humans, human error will happen.
So what do I think will improve the accident rate?
1. Stop scene flights - pre-establish appropriate landing zones that pilots can familiarize themselves with if they work in the area
2. Stop night flying unless in an IFR ship and only to and from IFR pads, hospitals will need to invest in getting their pad IFR rated or stop flying at night
3. More local education to providers - studies have shown that if your drive time is less than 45 minutes, you're better off driving. Less flying = less crashing